Abstract. A general technique to protect a cryptographic algorithm against side-channel attacks consists in masking all intermediate variables with a random value. For cryptographic algorithms combining Boolean operations with arithmetic operations, one must then perform conversions between Boolean masking and arithmetic masking. At CHES 2001, Goubin described a very elegant algorithm for converting from Boolean masking to arithmetic masking, with only a constant number of operations. Goubin also described an algorithm for converting from arithmetic to Boolean masking, but with O(k) operations where k is the addition bit size. In this paper we describe an improved algorithm with time complexity O(log k) only. Our new algorithm is based on the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder, which computes the carry signal in O(log k) instead of O(k) for the classical ripple carry adder. We also describe an algorithm for performing arithmetic addition modulo 2 k directly on Boolean shares, with the same complexity O(log k) instead of O(k). We prove the security of our new algorithm against first-order attacks. Our algorithm performs well in practice, as for k = 64 we obtain a 23% improvement compared to Goubin's algorithm.
Introduction
Side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks belong to the genre of implementation attacks and exploit the fact that any device performing a cryptographic algorithm leaks information related to the secret key through certain physical phenomena such as execution time, power consumption, EM radiation, etc. Depending on the source of the information leakage and the required post-processing, one can distinguish different categories of side-channel attacks, e.g. timing attacks, Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks [KJJ99] . The former uses data-dependent (i.e. plaintext-dependent) variations in the execution time of a cryptographic algorithm to deduce information about the secret key involved in the computation of the ciphertext. In contrast, power analysis attacks require the attacker to measure the power consumption of a device while it executes a cryptographic algorithm [PMO07] . To perform an SPA attack, the attacker typically collects only one (or very few) power trace(s) and attempts to recover the secret key by focusing on differences between patterns within a trace. A DPA attack, on the other hand, requires many power traces and employs sophisticated statistical techniques to analyze differences between the traces [MOP07] .
Even though DPA was first described using the DES algorithm as an example, it became soon clear that power analysis attacks can also be applied to break other secret-key algorithms, e.g. AES as well as public-key algorithms, e.g. RSA. A DPA attack normally exploits the principle of divide and conquer, which is possible since most block ciphers use the secret key only partially at a given point of time. Hence, the attacker can recover one part of the key at a time by studying the relationship between the actual power consumption and estimated power values derived from a theoretical model of the device. During the past 15 years, dozens of papers about successful DPA attacks on different implementations (hardware, software) of numerous secret-key cryptosystems (block ciphers, stream ciphers, keyed-hash message authentication codes) have been published. The experiments described in these papers confirm the real-world impact of DPA attacks in the sense that unprotected (or insufficiently protected) implementations of cryptographic algorithms can be broken in relatively short time using relatively cheap equipment.
The vast number of successful DPA attacks reported in the literature has initiated a large body of research on countermeasures. From a high-level point of view, countermeasures against DPA attacks can be divided into hiding (i.e. decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio) and masking (i.e. randomizing all the sensitive data) [MOP07] . Approaches to hiding-style countermeasures attempt to "equalize" the power consumption profile (i.e. making the power consumption invariant for all possible values of the secret key) or to randomize the power consumption so that a profile can no longer be correlated to any secret information. Masking, on the other hand, conceals every key-dependent intermediate result with a random value, the so-called mask, in order to break the dependency between the sensitive variable (i.e. involving the secret key) and the power consumption.
The masking countermeasure. Though masking is often considered to be less efficient (in terms of execution time) than hiding, it provides the key benefit that one can formally prove its security under certain assumptions on the device leakage model and the attacker's capabilities. The way masking is applied depends on the concrete operations executed by a cipher. In general, logical operations (e.g. XOR, Shift, etc.) are protected using Boolean masking, whereas additions/subtractions and multiplications require arithmetic and multiplicative masking, respectively. When a cryptographic algorithm involves a combination of these operations, it becomes necessary to convert the masks from one form to the other in order to get the correct result. Examples of algorithms that perform both arithmetic (e.g. modular addition) and logical operations include two SHA-3 finalists (namely Blake and Skein) as well as all four stream ciphers in the eS-TREAM software portfolio. Also, ARX-based block ciphers (e.g. XTEA [NW97] and Threefish) and the hash functions SHA-1 and SHA-2 fall into this category. From a design point of view, modular addition gives essential non-linearity with increased throughput and hence is used in several lightweight block ciphers e.g. SPECK [BSS + 13]. Therefore, techniques for conversion between Boolean and arithmetic masks are of significant practical importance.
Conversion between Boolean and arithmetic masking. At CHES 2001, Goubin described a very elegant algorithm for converting from Boolean masking to arithmetic masking, with only a constant number of operations, independent of the addition bit size k. Goubin also described an algorithm for converting from arithmetic to Boolean masking, but with O(k) operations. A different arithmetic to Boolean conversion algorithm was later described in [CT03] , based on precomputed tables; an extension was described in [NP04] to reduce the memory consumption. At CHES 2012, Debraize described a modification of the tablebased conversion in [CT03] , correcting a bug and improving time performances, still with asymptotic complexity O(k).
Karroumi et al. recently noticed in [KRJ14] that Goubin's recursion formula for converting from arithmetic to Boolean masking can also be used to compute an arithmetic addition z = x+y mod 2 k directly with masked shares x = x 1 ⊕x 2 and y = y 1 ⊕ y 2 . The advantage of this method is that one doesn't need to follow the three step process, i.e. converting x and y from Boolean to arithmetic masking, then performing the addition with arithmetic masks and then converting back from arithmetic to Boolean masks. The authors showed that this can lead to better performances in practice for the block cipher XTEA. However, as their algorithm is based on Goubin's recursion formula, its complexity is still O(k).
Conversion algorithms have recently been extended to higher-order countermeasure in [CGV14] , based on Goubin's conversion method. For security against any attack of order t, their solution has time complexity O(n 2 · k) for n = 2t + 1 shares.
New algorithms with logarithmic complexity. In this paper we describe a new algorithm for converting from arithmetic to Boolean masking with complexity O(log k) instead of O(k). Our algorithm is based on the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder [KS73] , which computes the carry signal in O(log k) instead of O(k) for the classical ripple carry adder. Following [BN05] and [KRJ14] we also describe a variant algorithm for performing arithmetic addition modulo 2 k directly on Boolean shares, with complexity O(log k) instead of O(k). We prove the security of our new algorithms against first-order attacks.
We also provide implementation results for our algorithms along with existing algorithms on a 32-bit microcontroller. Our results show that the new algorithms perform better than Goubin's algorithm for k ≥ 32, as we obtain 14% improvement in execution time for k = 32, and 23% improvement for k = 64. We also describe our results for first-order secure implementations of HMAC-SHA-1 (k = 32) and of the SPECK block-cipher (k = 64).
Goubin's Algorithms
In this section we first recall Goubin's algorithm for converting from Boolean masking to arithmetic masking and conversely [Gou01] , secure against first-order attacks. Given a k-bit variable x, for Boolean masking we write:
where x is the masked variable and r ← {0, 1}
k . Similarly for arithmetic masking we write
In the following all additions and subtractions are done modulo 2 k , for some parameter k.
The goal of the paper is to describe efficient conversion algorithms between Boolean and arithmetic masking, secure against first-order attacks. Given x and r, one should compute the arithmetic mask A = (x ⊕ r) − r mod 2 k without leaking information about x = x ⊕ r; this implies that one cannot compute A = (x ⊕ r) − r mod 2 k directly, as this would leak information about the sensitive variable x = x ⊕r; instead all intermediate variables should be properly randomized so that no information is leaked about x. Similarly given A and r one must compute the Boolean mask x = (A + r) ⊕ r without leaking information about x = A + r.
Boolean to Arithmetic Conversion
We first recall the Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm from Goubin [Gou01] . One considers the following function Ψ x (r) :
Theorem 1 (Goubin [Gou01] ). The function Ψ x (r) = (x ⊕ r) − r is affine over F 2 .
Using this affine property, the conversion from Boolean to arithmetic masking is straightforward. Given x , r ∈ F 2 k we must compute A such that x ⊕r = A+r. From the affine property of Ψ x (r) we can write:
for any r 2 ∈ F 2 k . Therefore the technique consists in first generating a uniformly distributed random r 2 in F 2 k , then computing Ψ x (r⊕r 2 ) and Ψ x (r 2 )⊕Ψ x (0) separately, and finally performing XOR operation on these two to get A. The technique is clearly secure against first-order attacks; namely the left term Ψ x (r⊕r 2 ) is independent from r and therefore from x = x ⊕ r, and the right term Ψ x (r 2 ) ⊕ Ψ x (0) is also independent from r and therefore from x. Note that the technique is very efficient as it requires only a constant number of operations (independent of k).
From Arithmetic to Boolean Masking
Goubin also described in [Gou01] a technique for converting from arithmetic to Boolean masking, secure against first-order attacks. However it is more complex than from Boolean to arithmetic masking; its complexity is O(k) for additions modulo 2 k . It is based on the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Goubin [Gou01] ). If we denote x = (A + r) ⊕ r, we also have x = A ⊕ u k−1 , where u k−1 is obtained from the following recursion formula:
Since the iterative computation of u i contains only XOR and AND operations, it can easily be protected against first-order attacks. We refer to Appendix A for the full conversion algorithm.
A New Recursive Formula based on Kogge-Stone Adder
Our new conversion algorithm is based on the Kogge-Stone adder [KS73] , a carry look-ahead adder that generates the carry signal in O(log k) time, when addition is performed modulo 2 k . In this section we first recall the classical ripple-carry adder, which generates the carry signal in O(k) time, and we show how Goubin's recursion formula (1) can be derived from it. The derivation of our new recursion formula from the Kogge-Stone adder will proceed similarly.
The Ripple-Carry Adder and Goubin's Recursion Formula
We first recall the classical ripple-carry adder. Given three bits x, y and c, the carry c for x + y + c can be computed as c = (x ∧ y) ⊕ (x ∧ c) ⊕ (y ∧ c). Therefore, the modular addition of two k-bit variables x and y can be defined recursively as follows:
for 0 ≤ i < k, where
where x (i) represents the i th bit of the variable x, with x (0) being the least significant bit.
In the following, we show how recursion (3) can be computed directly with k-bit values instead of bits, which enables us to recover Goubin's recursion (1). For this, we define the sequences x j , y j and v j whose j + 1 least significant bits are the same as x, y and c respectively:
for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. Since c (0) = 0 we can actually start the summation for v j at i = 1; we get from (3):
which gives the recursive equation:
Therefore we have obtained a recursion similar to (3), but with k-bit values instead of single bits. Note that from the definition of v j in (4) the variables v j and v j+1 have the same least significant bits from bit 0 to bit j, which is not immediately obvious when considering only recursion (5). Combining (2) and (4) we obtain x j + y j = x j ⊕ y j ⊕ v j for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. For k-bit values x and y, we have x = x k−1 and y = y k−1 , which gives:
We now define the same recursion as (5), but with constant x, y instead of x j , y j . That is, we let
which is exactly the same recursion as Goubin's recursion (1). It is easy to show inductively that the variables u j and v j have the same least significant bits, from bit 0 to bit j. Let us assume that this is true for u j and v j . From recursions (5) and (6) we have that the least significant bits of v j+1 and u j+1 from bit 0 to bit j + 1 only depend on the least significant bits from bit 0 to bit j of v j , x j and y j , and of u j , x and y respectively. Since these are the same, the induction is proved.
Eventually for k-bit registers we have u k−1 = v k−1 , which proves Goubin's recursion formula (1), namely:
As mentioned previously, this recursion formula requires k − 1 iterations on kbit registers. In the following, we describe an improved recursion based on the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder, requiring only log 2 k iterations.
The Kogge-Stone Carry Look-Ahead Adder
In this section we first recall the general solution from [KS73] for first-order recurrence equations; the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder is a direct application.
General first-order recurrence equation. We consider the following recurrence equation:
We define the function Q(m, n) for m ≥ n:
, and more generally:
Therefore the sequence Q(m, 0) satisfies the same recurrence as z m , which implies Q(m, 0) = z m for all m ≥ 0. Moreover we have:
which gives the recursive doubling equation:
where each term Q(m − 1, 0) and Q(2m − 1, m) contain only m terms a i and b i , instead of 2m in Q(2m − 1, 0). Therefore the two terms can be computed in parallel. This is also the case for the product 2m−1 j=m a j which can be computed with a product tree. Therefore by recursive splitting with N processors, the sequence element z N can be computed in time O(log 2 N ), instead of O(N ) with a single processor.
The Kogge-Stone Carry Look-Ahead Adder. The Kogge-Stone carry lookahead adder [KS73] is a direct application of the previous technique. Namely
for all i ≥ 0, we obtain from (3) the recurrence relation for the carry signal c i :
which is similar to (7), where ∧ is the multiplication and ⊕ the addition. We can therefore compute the carry signal c i for 0
More precisely, the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder can be defined as follows. For all 0 ≤ j < k one defines the sequence of bits:
and the following recursive equations:
for 2 i−1 ≤ j < k, and P i,j = P i−1,j and G i,j = G i−1,j for 0 ≤ j < 2 i−1 . The following lemma shows that the carry signal c j can be computed from the sequence G i,j .
Lemma 1. We have (x+y)
(j) = x (j) ⊕y (j) ⊕c j for all 0 ≤ j < k where the carry signal c j is computed as c 0 = 0, c 1 = G 0,0 and c j+1 = G i,j for 2 i−1 ≤ j < 2 i .
To compute the carry signal up to c k−1 , one must therefore compute the sequences P i,j and G i,j up to i = log 2 (k − 1) . For completeness we provide the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
Our New Recursive Algorithm
We now derive a recursion formula with k-bit variables instead of single bits; we proceed as in Section 3.1, using the more efficient Kogge-Stone carry lookahead algorithm, instead of the classical ripple-carry adder for Goubin's recursion. We prove the following theorem, analogous to Theorem 2, but with complexity O(log k) instead of O(k). Given a variable x, we denote by x the variable x left-shifted by bits, keeping only k bits in total.
Theorem 3. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1} k and n = log 2 (k − 1) . Define the sequence of k-bit variables P i and G i , with P 0 = x ⊕ y and G 0 = x ∧ y, and
Proof. We start from the sequences P i,j and G i,j defined in Section 3.2 corresponding to the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder, and we proceed as in Section 3.1. We define the variables:
which from (9) gives the initial condition P 0 = x ⊕ y and G 0 = x ∧ y, and using (10):
We can start the summation of the P i,j bits with j = 2 i−1 − 1 instead of 2 i − 1, because the other summation still starts with j = 2 i −1, hence the corresponding bits are ANDed with 0. This gives:
Hence we get the same recursion formula for P i as in (11). Similarly we have using (10):
Therefore we obtain the same recurrence for P i and G i as (11). Since from Lemma 1 we have that c j+1 = G i,j for all 2 i−1 ≤ j < 2 i , and
n . This implies:
Since from Lemma 1 we have (x + y)
The complexity of the previous recursion is only O(log k), as opposed to O(k) with Goubin's recursion. The sequence can be computed using the algorithm below; note that we do not compute the last element P n since it is not used in the computation of G n . Note also that the algorithm below could be used as a O(log k) implementation of arithmetic addition z = x + y mod 2 k for processors having only Boolean operations.
Algorithm 1 Kogge-Stone Adder
Input: x, y ∈ {0, 1} k , and n = max( log 2 (k − 1) , 1).
Our New Conversion Algorithm
Our new conversion algorithm from arithmetic to Boolean masking is a direct application of the Kogge-Stone adder in Algorithm 1. We are given as input two arithmetic shares A, r of x = A + r mod 2 k , and we must compute x such that x = x ⊕ r, without leaking information about x.
Since Algorithm 1 only contains Boolean operations, it is easy to protect against first-order attacks. Assume that we give as input the two arithmetic shares A and r to Algorithm 1; the algorithm first computes P = A ⊕ r and G = A ∧ r, and after n iterations outputs x = A + r = A ⊕ r ⊕ (2G). Obviously one cannot compute P = A ⊕ r and G = A ∧ r directly since that would reveal information about the sensitive variable x = A + r. Instead we protect all intermediate variables with a random mask s using standard techniques, that is we only work with P = P ⊕ s and G = G ⊕ s. Eventually we obtain a masked x = x ⊕ s as required, in time O(log k) instead of O(k).
Secure Computation of AND
Since Algorithm 1 contains AND operations, we first show how to secure the AND operation against first-order attacks. The technique is essentially the same as in [ISW03] . With x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ t for two independent random masks s and t, we have for any u:
Algorithm 2 SecAnd
Input: x , y , s, t, u such that x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ t. Output: z such that z = (x ∧ y) ⊕ u.
We see that the SecAnd algorithm requires 8 Boolean operations. The following Lemma shows that the SecAnd algorithm is secure against first-order attacks.
Lemma 2. When s, t and u are uniformly and independently distributed in F 2 k , all intermediate variables in the SecAnd algorithm have a distribution independent from x and y.
Proof. Since s and t are uniformly and independently distributed in F 2 k , the variables x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ t are also uniformly and independently distributed in F 2 k . Therefore the distribution of x ∧ y is independent from x and y. The same holds for the variables x ∧ t, s ∧ y and s ∧ t. Moreover since u is uniformly distributed in F 2 k , the distribution of z from Line 1 to Line 4 is uniform in F 2 k ; hence its distribution is also independent from x and y.
Secure Computation of XOR
Similarly we show how to secure the XOR computation of Algorithm 1. With x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ u where s and u are two independent masks, we have:
Algorithm 3 SecXor
Input: x , y , u, such that x = x ⊕ s, and y = y ⊕ u.
We see that the SecXor algorithm requires 2 Boolean operations. The following Lemma shows that the SecXor algorithm is secure against first-order attacks. It is easy to see that all the intermediate variables in the algorithm are uniformly distributed in F 2 k , and hence the proof is straightforward.
Lemma 3. When s and u are uniformly and independently distributed in F 2 k , all intermediate variables in the SecXor algorithm have a distribution independent from x and y.
Secure Computation of Shift
Finally we show how to secure the Shift operation in Algorithm 1 against firstorder attacks. With x = x ⊕ s, we have for any t:
This gives the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4 SecShift
Input: x , s, t and j such that x = x ⊕ s and j > 0.
Output: y such that y = (x j) ⊕ t.
We see that the SecShift algorithm requires 4 Boolean operations. The following Lemma shows that the SecShift algorithm is secure against first-order attacks. The proof is straightforward so we omit it.
Lemma 4. When s and t are uniformly and independently distributed in F 2 k , all intermediate variables in the SecShift algorithm have a distribution independent from x.
Our New Conversion Algorithm
Finally we can convert Algorithm 1 into a first-order secure algorithm by protecting all intermediate variables with a random mask; see Algorithm 5 below.
Since the SecAnd subroutine requires 8 operations, the SecXor subroutine requires 2 operations, and the SecShift subroutine requires 4 operations, lines 7 to 11 require 2·8+2·4+2+2 = 28 operations, hence 28·(n−1) operations for the main loop. The total number of operations is then 7 + 28 · (n − 1) + 4 + 8 + 2 + 4 = 28 · n − 3. In summary, for a register size k = 2 n the number of operations is 28 · log 2 k − 3, in addition to the generation of 3 random numbers. Note that the same random numbers s, t and u can actually be used for all executions of the conversion algorithm in a given execution. The following Lemma proves the security of our new conversion algorithm against first-order attacks.
Lemma 5. When r is uniformly distributed in F 2 k , any intermediate variable in Algorithm 5 has a distribution independent from x = A + r mod 2 k .
Proof. The proof is based on the previous lemma for SecAnd, SecXor and SecShift, and also the fact that all intermediate variables from Line 2 to 5 and in lines 12, 13, 18, and 19 have a distribution independent from x. Namely (A⊕t)∧r and t ∧ r have a distribution independent from x, and the other intermediate variables have the uniform distribution.
Algorithm 5 Kogge-Stone Arithmetic to Boolean Conversion
Input: A, r ∈ {0, 1} k and n = max( log 2 (k − 1) , 1) Output: x such that x ⊕ r = A + r mod 2
P ← P ⊕ s 13:
Addition Without Conversion
Beak and Noh proposed a method to mask the ripple carry adder in [BN05] . Similarly, Karroumi et al.
[KRJ14] used Goubin's recursion formula (1) to compute an arithmetic addition z = x + y mod 2 k directly with masked shares x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ r, that is without first converting x and y from Boolean to arithmetic masking, then performing the addition with arithmetic masks, and then converting back from arithmetic to Boolean masks. They showed that this can lead to better performances in practice for the block cipher XTEA.
In this section we describe an analogous algorithm for performing addition directly on the masked shares, based on the Kogge-Stone adder instead of Goubin's formula, to get O(log k) complexity instead of O(k). More precisely, we receive as input the shares x , y such that x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ r, and the goal is to compute z such that z = (x + y) ⊕ r. For this it suffices to perform the addition z = x + y mod 2 k as in Algorithm 1, but with the masked variables x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ r instead of x, y, while protecting all intermediate variables with a Boolean mask; this is straightforward since Algorithm 1 contains only Boolean operations; see Algorithm 6 below.
Algorithm 6 Kogge-Stone Masked Addition
Input: x , y , r, s ∈ {0, 1} k and n = max( log 2 (k − 1) , 1). Output: z such that z = (x + y) ⊕ r, where x = x ⊕ s and y = y ⊕ r 1:
As previously the main loop requires 28·(n−1) operations. The total number of operations is then 12+28·(n−1)+20 = 28·n+4. In summary, for a register size k = 2 n the number of operations is 28·log 2 k+4, with additionally the generation of 2 random numbers; as previously those 2 random numbers along with r and s can be reused for subsequent additions within the same execution. The following Lemma proves the security of Algorithm 6 against first-order attacks. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5 and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 6. For a uniformly and independently distributed randoms r ∈ {0, 1} k and s ∈ {0, 1} k , any intermediate variable in the Kogge-Stone Masked Addition has the uniform distribution.
6 Analysis and Implementation
Comparison With Existing Algorithms
We compare in Table 1 the complexity of our new algorithms with Goubin's algorithms and Debraize's algorithms for various addition bit sizes k.
1 We give the number of random numbers required for each of the algorithms as well the number of elementary operations. Goubin's original conversion algorithm from arithmetic to Boolean masking required 5k + 5 operations and a single random generation. This was recently improved by Karroumi et al. down to 5k + 1 operations [KRJ14] . The authors also provided an algorithm to compute first-order secure addition on Boolean shares using Goubin's recursion formula, requiring 5k + 8 operations and a single random generation. See Appendix A for more details. On the other hand Debraize's algorithm requires 19(k/ ) − 2 operations with a lookup table of size 2 and the generation of two randoms. We see that our algorithms outperform Goubin's algorithms for k ≥ 32 but are slower than Debraize's algorithm with = 8 (without taking into account its pre-computation phase). In practice, most cryptographic constructions performing arithmetic operations use addition modulo 2 32 ; for example HMAC-SHA-1 [NIS95] and XTEA [NW97] . There also exists cryptographic constructions with additions modulo 2 64 , for example Threefish used in the hash function Skein, a SHA-3 finalist, and the SPECK block-cipher (see Section 6.3).
Practical Implementation
We have implemented our new algorithms along with Goubin's algorithms; we have also implemented the table-based arithmetic to Boolean conversion algorithm described by Debraize in [Deb12] . For Debraize's algorithm, we considered two possibilities for the partition of the data, with word length = 4 and = 8. Our implementations were done on a 32-bit AVR microcontroller AT32UC3A0512, based on RISC microprocessor architecture. It can run at frequencies up to 66 MHZ and has SRAM of size 64 KB along with a flash of 512 KB. We used the C programming language and the machine code was produced using the AVR-GCC compiler with further optimization (e.g. loop unrolling). For the generation of random numbers we used a pseudorandom number generator based on linear feedback shift registers.
2
The results are summarized in Table 2 . We can see that our new algorithms perform better than Goubin's algorithms from k = 32 onward. When k = 32, our algorithms perform roughly 14% better than Goubin's algorithms. Moreover, our conversion algorithm performs 7% better than Debraize's algorithm ( = 4). For k = 64, we can see even better improvement i.e., 23% faster than Goubin's algorithm and 22% better than Debraize's algorithm ( = 4). On the other hand, Debraize's algorithm performs better than our algorithms for = 8 ; however as opposed to Debraize's algorithm our conversion algorithm requires neither preprocessing nor extra memory. As we can see our algorithms outperform Goubin and Debraize's algorithm ( = 4), but not Debraize's algorithm for = 8, as for HMAC-SHA-1.
Therefore we obtain c i+1 = z i for all i ≥ 0. From the Q(m, n) function given in (8) we define the sequences: We obtain a similar recurrence for P i,j when j ≥ 2 i−1 : In summary we obtain for j ≥ 2 i−1 the relations:
G i,j = P i−1,j · G i−1,j−2 i−1 + G i−1,j P i,j = P i−1,j · P i−1,j−2 i−1 which are exactly the same as (10) from Section 3.2. Moreover for 0 ≤ j < 2 i−1 , as in Section 3.2, we have G i,j = Q(j, 0) = G i−1,j and P i,j = P i−1,j . Finally we have the same initial conditions G 0,j = Q(j, j) = b j = x (j) ∧ y (j) and P 0,j = a j = x (j) ⊕ y (j) . This proves that the sequence G i,j defined by (10) in Section 3.2 is such that:
G i,j = Q j, max(j − 2 i + 1, 0)
This implies that we have G 0,0 = Q(0, 0) = z 0 and G i,j = Q(j, 0) = z j for all 2 i−1 ≤ j < 2 i . Moreover as noted initially we have c j+1 = z j for all j ≥ 0. Therefore the recurrence from Section 3.2 indeed computes the carry signal c j , with c 0 = 0, c 1 = G 0,0 and c j+1 = G i,j for 2 i−1 ≤ j < 2 i . This terminates the proof of Lemma 1.
